Materialism, Instrumental Reason, and Hostile Enlightenment

The Marquis de Sade as the Antithesis of the Enlightenment

Mykyta Storozhenko
Florida Atlantic University

Introduction

The aim of this paper is to tie together the Enlightenment ideas regarding Materialism and Instrumental Reason with Pierre Saint-Amand’s thought in his “Hostile Enlightenment” article. The paper will be a quadripartite, and will include the following: (1) a description of Julien Offray de la Mettrie’s materialist philosophy and his rejection of Cartesian reason, as well as a discussion of his ideas’ relevance and influence; (2) a description of the Marquis de Sade’s philosophy, particularly his materialism; (3) a reading of Pierre Saint-Amand’s “Hostile Enlightenment” with a particular focus on his thoughts regarding Sade; (4) a conclusion, in which I will argue that Sade is a direct representation of the Enlightenment giving birth to its own antithesis.

Section 1.1

Julien Offray de la Mettrie’s Materialism and Rejection of Cartesian Reason

In his “Man a Machine,” Julien Offray de la Mettrie offers up a materialistic and mechanistic account of man so radical that it “shocked even some of the most irreligious of his fellow philosophes.”¹ But what is it about his mechanistic and materialistic account that is so radical, shocking, and repulsive to his fellow philosophes? To understand just how far-out his philosophy was, I am going to offer an interpretation of his “Man a Machine.” I will first address his metaphysical materialism, and then his empiricist method coupled with his rejection of Cartesian reason.

La Mettrie starts off by claiming that thus far most, if not all, metaphysicians have bungled the great project of describing man: Locke claimed that matter is a thinking thing; Leibniz and his followers “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul;” and Descartes and his followers “recognized two distinct substances in man, as if they had seen them.”² Clearly, for La Mettrie, a metaphysical theory concerning man would have to avoid the very pitfalls into which his predecessors fell. His theory does not spiritualize matter, nor does it posit two distinct substances. La Mettrie claims that only “by seeking to discover the soul through the organs of the body, so to speak, that we can reach the highest probability concerning man’s own nature.”³ Here, we see him tying the soul, which he will soon collapse into mind, as present within the body. He emphasizes the relation between the soul and the body by stating the following: “Take this tired soldier. He snores in a trench, to a sound of a hundred cannon. His soul hears nothing; his sleep is perfect apoplexy… On the other hand, this man who is devoured by jealousy, hatred, avarice, or ambition, can never find any rest. The most peaceful spot, the coolest and the most calming drinks, have no effect on a man whose heart is a prey to the torment of passions.”⁴ Thus the relationship that La Mettrie argues for, the relationship between the soul and the body, is that of interrelatedness. If either component, the soul or the body, are not at rest, the other, consequentially, cannot be at rest either. He doesn’t stop at intertwining the soul and the body as one entity. La Mettrie roots the soul within the body, particularly the mind, by stating the following passage: “I always use the word “imagine,” because I think that everything is imagined and that all the faculties of the soul can be correctly reduced to pure imagination, which gives form to them all. Thus judgement, reason and memory, are in no wise absolute parts of
the soul, but real modification of the kind of medullary screen upon which images of the objects painted in the eye are reflected as by a magic lantern.\textsuperscript{75}

For La Mettrie, everything is an imaginary construction. One could even argue that the imagined soul, and as he states, its faculties, are mere metaphorical constructions meant to help one understand the nature of man. He asserts that reason, and other faculties, are merely modifications of the “medullary screen” or brain matter. All that is experienced, for La Mettrie, is mere imagination, caused by images projected onto the senses by a “magic lantern.” The soul, which really is just an amalgamated simulacrum of reason, judgement, and other faculties, is really just an arrangement within the brain. There is nothing but the brain, which is merely just the body itself. He briefly addresses natural law, stating that its merely a sensual defense mechanism—seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, and rejects the necessity of God within his metaphysical system.\textsuperscript{6} La Mettrie, in his concluding remarks regarding his metaphysics, asks us to “conclude boldly then that man is a machine, and that in the whole universe there is but a single substance with various modifications.”\textsuperscript{77} Man, within his framework, becomes a mere mechanistic machine, a slave to sensation, bound to a universe of which he is a part of by nature of his substantive constitution. A very radical idea indeed.

One would, of course, be right to interrogate La Mettrie as to why it is that he thinks that the methods employed by his predecessors are insufficient in constructing a plausible and valid metaphysical theory of man. He briefly critiques Locke, Leibniz and Descartes by arguing that they, and consequentially their followers, relied too much on instrumental reason and attributed to matter attributes it did not have.\textsuperscript{8} As a response, he argues that “experience and observation should here be our only guides” and that a valid philosophy of man, and metaphysics at large, ought to be found in works of “physicians who were philosophers, and not in the works of philosophers who were not physicians.”\textsuperscript{79} Here we start to see La Mettrie expose his empiricist and anti-rationalist standpoint. Naturally, questions regarding La Mettrie’s choice of approach toward a metaphysics of man emerge, namely and singularly, why use empiricism and not instrumental reason? In one of the passages, he asserts the following: “Man is such a complicated machine that it is impossible to form a clear idea of it beforehand, and hence impossible to define it. For this reason, all the investigations which the greatest philosophers have conducted a priori… have been fruitless. Thus it is only a posteriori… that we can reach the highest probability concerning man’s own nature.”\textsuperscript{710}

Here we see a two-fold argument made by La Mettrie. He not only rejects a priori rationalist attempts at constructing a metaphysical theory as it concerns man, but he argues that only through an a posteriori empirical method can a successful, a fruitful if you will, metaphysical theory of man emerge. Man, as La Mettrie asserts, is too complicated of a machine to be mapped out purely through reason, and therefore, only by empirical analysis can we gain any knowledge about man. His empiricism coupled with his rejection of Cartesian reason, or instrument reason, is made even more evident when he states, “I recognize only scientists as judges of the conclusions which I draw.”\textsuperscript{711}

It should be now evident why it is that Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s philosophy was radical enough to push away his fellow philosophers. His belief that man is a mere mechanistic automaton and a slave to sensations, coupled with his radical empiricism, would no doubt disturb some of the other Enlightenment materialists. Moreover, his rejection of reason as a useful faculty in conducting metaphysics, and moreover his reduction of reason to mere imaginary sensation caused by certain patterns and arrangement of the brain, a medullary screen as he terms it, went directly counter to the Enlightenment emphasis on reason as a universal faculty.

Section 1.2

Predecessors and Successors of Julien Offray de La Mettrie

I have, thus far, established the materialist and radical empiricist philosophy of Julien Offray de La Mettrie. However, I feel that a discussion of La Mettrie’s predecessors and successors, namely Descartes and D’Holbach respectively, would be prudential in understanding how much of an impact, despite others’ aversion to it, his philosophy had on Enlightenment thought.

While clearly being an Anti-Cartesian philosopher, La Mettrie was influenced by Descartes. Gertrude Carman Bussey argues that “it sometimes seems as if La Mettrie’s materialism grew out of his insistence on the contradictory character of the dualistic system of Descartes,” so much so that he “takes great pains to show the dependence of the soul on the body.”\textsuperscript{12} Clearly Descartes was an influence on La Mettrie, but not as someone whose ideas one wishes to inherit, but as someone whose ideas one wishes to refute. It should be noted, however, that though La Mettrie opposes Descartes on dualism, he does appropriate Descartes’ mechanistic conception of man.\textsuperscript{13} Regarding methodology, Bussey states that “La Mettrie’s method was different from that of Descartes, for La Mettrie was an empiricist without rationalistic
leanings.”

La Mettrie was not only an empiricist without rationalistic leanings, one could argue that he rejected instrumental reason outright, contra Descartes. It is my interpretation that, inasmuch as he reacts against Cartesian dualism, he reacts against Cartesian instrumental reason. He rejects a priori reason as a sufficient instrument in constructing a metaphysical theory of man, and further reduces reason to imagination within the brain. Descartes, for La Mettrie, was a philosopher to learn from, and react against.

Baron Paul Heinrich Dietrich von Holbach, without a doubt a significant intellectual of the Enlightenment, was indubitably influenced by La Mettrie. Bussey states that “the teaching of D’Holbach is so like that of La Mettrie, that the similarity can hardly be a coincidence.” Rightfully so, D’Holbach inherited a lot of La Mettrie’s philosophy. D’Holbach, much like La Mettrie, believes that “experience is our only source of knowledge in all matters” and that “man is a purely material being.” Not only does D’Holbach appropriate La Mettrie’s philosophy, he carries it to one of its possible conclusions. Bussey argues that as “natural consequence of La Mettrie’s teachings,” D’Holbach claims “that all freedom is a delusion, and that man is controlled in every action by rigid necessity.” If we are to take D’Holbach’s philosophy as a possible outcome of La Mettrie’s metaphysics, a man is nothing more than a material mechanistic automaton, delusional with freedom while merely a slave to sensation.

Though La Mettrie’s influence on d’Holbach is evident now, one would be right to question why there is little mention of him. As I previously stated, many of La Mettrie’s fellow philosophes were repulsed by his radically materialist metaphysical theory of man. Bussey further argues that many Enlightenment philosophes, including Condillac among others, tended to never reference La Mettrie, for “the works of La Mettrie had been so condemned that later philosophes wished to conceal the similarity of their doctrines to his.” It becomes evident that La Mettrie was far more influential than most scholars realize. Moreover, the fact that La Mettrie was shunned when he first published his “Man a Machine,” yet D’Holbach, building on La Mettrie’s theories, was an influential member of the Enlightenment, shows the change in thought of the Enlightenment.

Section 2

The Marquis de Sade and his Materialism

Now that I have established Julien Offray de La Mettrie’s materialism, and moreover the significant, though covert, of his thought, I would like to turn the reader’s attention to Sade. This section will focus on Sade’s “Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man” (1782), as it serves as an exposition of Sade’s materialism. Within the pages of the “Dialogue,” Sade presents two characters—a priest and a dying man. The conversation, which at times could be called an argument, between the priest and the dying man deals with topics of nature, God, and metaphysics. The aspects on which I will focus are Sade’s thoughts which often come off as a reiteration of La Mettrie’s materialism. The dialogue starts when the priest asks the dying man to repent, and as a retort, the dying man launches into an explorative dialogue. When explaining that for which he repents, the dying man states the following: “By nature created, created with very keen tastes, with very strong passions; placed on this earth for the sole purpose of yielding to them and satisfying them, and these effects of my creation being naught but necessities directly relating to Nature’s fundamental designs… all in accordance with her laws, I repent not having acknowledged her omnipotence as fully as I might have done… I did sometimes resist her, I repent… I only plucked an occasional flower when I might have gathered an ample harvest of fruit.”

Here we see the initial exposition of Sade’s materialism through the dying man’s words. He claims that he, the dying man, was created by nature, with passions and desires, obliged to serve or deny those desires, all according to natural design. He repents for not acknowledging the fact that he is a slave to sensations, that he resisted natural impulse, that he sublimated his passions. The dying man’s prose reveals that Sade believes man to be full of passions and desires, placed on this earth for the sole purpose of yielding to them and satisfying them, and these effects of my creation being naught but necessities directly relating to Nature’s fundamental designs… all in accordance with her laws, I repent not having acknowledged her omnipotence as fully as I might have done… I did sometimes resist her, I repent… I only plucked an occasional flower when I might have gathered an ample harvest of fruit.”

Here we see Sade reveal not only his empiricism, but also his mechanistic conception of the world. The dying man only believes that which he sensually experiences, in other words, sensual reality is all that there is for him. The sun and
other natural phenomena are mechanical in nature. Thus far, Sade does not appear very radical in his approach. Granted, he rejects God and holds the universe to be mechanistic. Thus far, La Mettrie and Sade do not differ much.

Sade’s reiteration of materialism, which I hold to be another possible conclusion stemming from La Mettrie, is very different from that of D’Holbach. His materialism is best seen in the following prose that the dying man speaks: “Before my eyes have I not the example of Nature’s perpetual generations and regenerations? Nothing perishes in the world, my friend, nothing is lost; man today, worm tomorrow, the day after tomorrow a fly; is it not to keep steadily on existing?”26 Thus, for Sade, everything in Nature is merely matter. A man is mere iteration, an arrangement of matter in a particular pattern. Thus, man is no longer sacred, for man is merely matter which can always be otherwise. Sade does not stop at denigrating man to mere arrangement of matter, he carries out some of the possible implications, particularly regarding freedom. The dying man states the following: “We are the pawns of an irresistible force, and never for an instant is it within our power to do anything but make the best of our lot and forge ahead… There is not a single virtue which is not necessary to Nature and conversely not a single crime which she does not need and it is in the perfect balance she maintains between the one and the other that her immense science consists; but can we be guilty for adding our weight to this side of that when it is she who tosses us onto the scales? No more so than the hornet who thrusts his dart into your skin.”27

It appears that for Sade, as a consequence of us being pure matter enslaved to the desires and impulses that Nature endows us with, there isn’t much freedom other than to make the best of what we have. Moreover, he seems to disregard the responsibility for wrongdoing, for as consequence of being a slave to natural instinct, the wrongdoer is no guiltier than a hornet or a bee who stings. In other words, vice and virtue become naturalized within Sade’s materialist framework. The priest asks the dying man to clarify his position, because it seems that the dying man is justifying any and all crime. The dying man retorts, and states the following: “Let evil deed be proscribed by law, let justice smite the criminal, that will be deterrent enough; but if by misfortune we do commit it even so, let’s not cry over spilled milk; remorse is inefficacious, since it does not stay us from crime, futile since it does not repair it… the entirety of human morals is contained in this one phrase: Render others as happy as one desires oneself to be, and never inflict more pain upon them than one would like to receive at their hands.”28 Though it does appear as if Sade recants his more radical claim that vice and crime is natural and one cannot quite be blamed for it, one still sees the sensual and materialist influence in his conception of crime and punishment. The only deterrent from committing a crime, for Sade, is the negative sensation of punishment, pain that is. This becomes even more evident in his moral maxim, which emphasizes pain and pleasure at the hands of the other. Not only is Sade a radical materialist, he is a pure sensualist.

Though there is not direct link between La Mettrie and Sade, it becomes evident, and quite plausible, that Sadean philosophy represents a possible outcome of La Mettrie’s philosophy. The materialism, the emphasis on sensation and empiricism, the rejection of reason, all that La Mettrie espoused, are evident in Sade. Whether directly or indirectly influenced by La Mettrie, Sade is similar to D’Holbach, in that his metaphysics are a direct reincarnation of La Mettrie’s.

Section 3

Pierre Saint-Amand’s “Hostile Enlightenment”

Pierre Saint-Amand, in his article “Hostile Enlightenment,” provides an interesting tendency of Enlightenment philosophers to downplay the inherent existence and fundamentality of violence in society. While he does explore various philosophers and their ideas of reciprocity, his thoughts of Sade are of importance and relevance to this paper. For the purpose of this paper, I will first offer a brief summary of Saint-Amand’s article, and then focus in greater detail on this thoughts regarding Sade.

Saint-Amand argues that the Enlightenment is full of naïveté concerning societal reciprocity, and claims that he “would like to dismiss enlightenment ideology of ‘universal reciprocity,’ of progress from warfare and its replacement by the rule of law.”29 As proof of the Enlightenment naïve assumptions concerning benevolent societal reciprocity, he brings up the Encyclopédie definition of sociability, which is as follows—“the disposition that leads us to bring to other men all of the good that can be asked of us, to reconcile our happiness with that of others, and always to subordinate our particular advantage in favor of the common and general advantage.”30 Clearly, for the Enlightenment philosophers, sociability and the reciprocity inherent within sociability, is always positive and for the greater good. Saint-Amand aims to undermine the Enlightenment naivety, and brings up the notion of vengeance as a model of violent reciprocity. As an example of vengeance always being at hand, he brings up the French Revolution, stating that “the assassination of the king could in fact be seen as the most spectacular instance, the immeasurable culmination, of revenge—as a ‘sovereign vengeance.’”31 Saint-Amand brings up the Encyclopédie as an example of what Enlightenment philosophers
thought of vengeance, which for them is merely a feeling which is condemned by natural law.\textsuperscript{32} He retorts, and states that "vengeance represents a model of reciprocity that the Enlightenment refused to consider… vengeance is a relation of hateful obligation… vengeance institutes a relation of malevolent reversibility, of spiteful reciprocity, between individuals."\textsuperscript{33} For Saint-Amand, vengeance becomes a model of reciprocity that, by its nature is violent and yet always present. A model of reciprocity that the Enlightenment philosophers would not consider, for it opposes their very notion of progress and benevolence. He goes on to invoke Rousseau and Montesquieu as Enlightenment philosophers who attempted to first—refute violence as fundamental, and second—to sublimate the violence arising in society into various non-violent outlets.\textsuperscript{34} After talking about Rousseau and Montesquieu, Saint-Amand moves on to Sade.

Though up to this point in the paper, I’ve discussed Sade’s materialism and sensual empiricism, Saint-Amand provides an interesting look at Sade’s political and social philosophy, which indubitably is influenced by his metaphysics. Saint-Amand states that “given Sade’s definitive ejection of Enlightenment idealism and his thorough corruption of the rationalism of the period, it is not surprising that vengeance appears in his work… In Sade’s view, evil is synonymous with human relations; violent reciprocity is ineluctable.”\textsuperscript{35} Here, we see an interesting interpretation of Sade. Saint-Amand argues that Sade rejects the Enlightenment idealism, and rightfully so, for in his “Dialogue” discussed in the previous section of the essay, he rejects the notions of responsibility for vice and virtue, arguing that all is natural.\textsuperscript{36} Saint-Amand claims that Sade corrupts rationalism, and so he does, for he rejects anything but that which he knows sensually.\textsuperscript{37} Saint-Amand continues his exposition of Sade, and states that "he is animated by an unmitigated devotion to the propagation of evil—crimes, murders, vengeance. Sade’s work might be said to eroticize vengeance. It gives vengeance a framework, a context where it is sublimated or recast as pleasure."\textsuperscript{38}

It appears that for Sade, vengeance becomes a sensation of pleasure, which is expected, since for him sensation is all there is. Saint-Amand further exposes Sadean notions of justice, stating that for Sade, justice, as conceived by the Enlightenment, is “a human structure riddled with egotistical and contradictory impulses… a sublimation of our passions.”\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, Sade makes a normative claim, arguing that “everyone should have access to the privilege of administering justice,” because if everyone holds the right to execute justice, no one will commit injustice out of threat of immediate and reciprocal response, or in other words, vengeance.\textsuperscript{40} Sade cleverly dismisses the Enlightenment notion of justice, and instead turns justice into a Mexican standoff. Saint-Amand further argues that Sade think “the law is a poor executor of justice… the law usurps the rights and passions of the individual.”\textsuperscript{41} Thus, for Sade, justice and law, as conceived of by the Enlightenment, are merely a sublimation of desire and the urge for revenge. Rather, for Sade, justice ought to be personal and sensual. Sade claims that “vengeance ought to be tasted in private and by him alone whom the deed has outraged.”\textsuperscript{42} It becomes clear that for him, justice ought to become vengeance. It is to be sensually experienced, as he puts it—“tasted,” privately, and by those who were wronged. Another example of Sade’s sensationalism, rooted in his materialist philosophy. Saint-Amand states that “Cruelty for Sade is the sheer and unabashed display of human inequality, of the natural antagonism that is the inevitable result of every confrontation between human individuals.”\textsuperscript{43} The key word here is “natural.” Cruelty, for Sade, is a mere representation of the natural inequality, antagonism, and violence. Recall that for Sade, that which is natural is never bad, on the contrary, that which is natural merely is present and nothing to fret about.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, for Sade, cruelty becomes normalized and naturalized. Cruelty is no less wrong than a wasp stinging someone. It should now be clear that Sade’s materialism, rejection of instrumental reason, and sensationalism influences his political and social philosophy, as made clear by Pierre Saint-Amand. Sade is the representation of “Hostile Enlightenment” in that he contorts and perverts the unseen crevices of thoughts running within the intellectual stream of the Enlightenment.

**Conclusion**

Throughout this paper, it was my intention to trace a line, from La Mettrie’s radical materialist philosophy and his rejection of instrumental reason, through Sade’s metaphysics, to Pierre Saint-Amand’s exposition of Sade’s social and political philosophy in his article “Hostile Enlightenment.” It becomes evident that La Mettrie’s materialism, his rejection of instrumental reason in favor of pure empiricism, and his emphasis on sensation are far more influential than it seems. He, without a doubt, as demonstrated by Gertrude Carman Bussey, influenced the intellectual stream of the Enlightenment. In fact, one can see La Mettrie’s radical materialism and empiricism reemerge in Sade. In his “Dialogue between a Priest and a Dying Man,” Sade provides a literary dialogical exposition of his materialist philosophy, and in a sense, carries La Mettrie’s thought to one of their possible, logically entailed, ends. For Sade, since all is matter and within Nature, there is no God or absolutes concerning right or wrong. In fact, vices and virtues are all natural, and within nature. In his “Hostile Enlightenment,” Pierre Saint-Amand describes the Enlightenment tendency to downplay violence inherent in society, and incorporates a brilliant exposition on Sade. He focuses on Sade’s social and political philosophy, which, when correlated to his metaphysical theory that Sade espouses in his “Dialogue,” reveals how his radical materialism and sensationalism shapes notions of justice and sociality.
The purpose of this exposition was to demonstrate the possible logical conclusion of materialism, combined with a rejection of instrumental reason and the tendency of the Enlightenment to sublimate violence in benevolence, a tendency which continues into the 21st century. We live in an age of science, and science, by its own nature, is empirical. La Mettrie’s exposition of man as a machine is by no means as radical to us as it was to his fellow philosophes. At the same time, that which is radical, and perhaps even uncomfortable, to us, is Sade’s philosophy, particularly his insistence on cruelty, crime and vice being natural and value neutral. Perhaps, it is because we’ve retained an uncorrupted notion of instrumental reason, or it may be the fact that Sade’s philosophy conflicts with our empathy, which too is a mere sensual feeling.

What can plausibly be said based on the readings which I have interpreted throughout this essay, is that Sade represents the Enlightenment undermining itself. La Mettrie was indubitably an influential philosopher within the Enlightenment, though covert. After all, D’Holbach, as we have discovered, was heavily influenced by La Mettrie, and was a significant intellectual within the Enlightenment. In a sense, Sade was too an Enlightenment philosophe. He came of the Enlightenment, and his thought was, without a doubt, shaped by the era. Except, Sade represents a contortion of Enlightenment philosophy. Much like La Mettrie metaphysics is a response to that of Descartes, though indubitably heavily influenced by him; Sade’s philosophy is a response to the Enlightenment, it is of the Enlightenment.

Pierre Saint-Amand highlights the fact that, for the large part, Enlightenment philosophes and philosophers refused to consider vengeance and acknowledge inherent violence present in society, instead choosing to sublimate any and all violence into competition of benevolence. Enlightenment strips the human of the desires that Sade speaks of. In refusing to acknowledge these desires and impulses, the Enlightenment thought gave birth to Sade, for he is the direct antithesis of all that the Enlightenment stands for. Yet, at the same time, Sade still remains of the Enlightenment, in that his thoughts, namely his metaphysics, are undeniably that of the Enlightenment.

References

2 Ibid, 202-3.
3 Ibid, 203.
4 Ibid, 204-5.
5 Ibid, 207.
6 Ibid, 208.
7 Ibid.
9 Ibid, 203.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid, 208.
12 “La Mettrie’s Relation to His Predecessors and to His Successors”, in Julien Offray de la Mettrie, *L’Homme Machine/Man a Machine*, with philosophical and historical notes by Gertrude Carman Bussey (La Salle: Open Court, 1988), 165.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, 166.
16 “La Mettrie’s Relation to His Predecessors and to His Successors”, 173.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
20 Bussey, “La Mettrie’s Relation to His Predecessors and to His Successors”, 171.
21 Donatien Alphonse François, Marquis de Sade, “Dialogue Between a Priest and a Dying Man” (1782), 165.
22 Ibid, 165-175.
23 Ibid, 165-6.
26 Ibid, 173.
30 Ibid, 147.
31 Ibid, 149.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid, 149-51.
37 Ibid, 168.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, 155.
44 Sade, “Dialogue Between a Priest and a Dying Man”, 174.