

THE

JOHN O'SULLIVAN MEMORIAL LECTURE SERIES



BLIND SPOT
THE SECRET
HISTORY OF U.S.
COUNTERTERRORISM

TIMOTHY NAFTALI
DIRECTOR,
RICHARD M. NIXON LIBRARY



DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
Dorothy F. Schmidt College of Arts and Letters
Florida Atlantic University



ABOUT THE JOHN O'SULLIVAN MEMORIAL LECTURE

In the spring of 2004, a group of senior citizen students at Florida Atlantic University paid tribute to John O'Sullivan, a beloved professor of history who died in 2000, by establishing a Memorial Fund to support an annual lecture in his honor.

In keeping with John's commitment to teaching, research, and community outreach, the mission of the John O'Sullivan Memorial Lectureship is to broaden and deepen public understanding of modern U.S. history. The Memorial Fund — which is administered by the Department of History — sponsors public lectures and classroom seminars by some of the most distinguished scholars and gifted teachers of American history. The lectures typically focus on topics relevant to Professor O'Sullivan's specialties in 20th Century U.S. history, including: World War II, the Vietnam War, the nuclear age, the Holocaust, peace history, political and diplomatic affairs, and other topics.

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Department of History
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2005

BLIND SPOT:

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“I’M GOING TO KILL YOU; I am a sick man.” The young man saying these words pointed a shiny, silver-plated .45 automatic at the white-haired gentleman he passed on the way to the front of the plane. It was July 1968 and Senator James O. Eastland, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, had just left his seat to go to the lavatory when the gunman pushed past him. Eastland hurried back to his seat but did not think he was a target. “[H]e wanted to get to the cockpit,” the senator later told reporters, “and I just happened to be in his way.” Once inside the cockpit, the hijacker, Oran Daniel Richard, ordered the Delta airlines plane flown to Havana.¹

In the summer of 1968, passengers flying to destinations in the American South knew that there was a real possibility that their plane would be hijacked and diverted to Cuba. This Delta flight was the eighth commercial jetliner hijacked in the United States that year alone. Since 1961, the year the first U.S. commercial plane was hijacked, twenty-one planes had been commandeered in flight, and all but one had been taken to Havana.² Hijackings to Cuba were becoming so frequent that U.S. pilots flying in the southern United States routinely carried maps of Havana’s Jose Marti Airport. The Swiss embassy in Washington, D.C., which handled U.S. official messages to the Cuban government, had forms prepared to use whenever Washington wished to formally request the return of a hijacked plane, its crew, and passengers. All the Swiss needed to do was to fill in the flight number and date the request.³

The plane carrying Senator Eastland did not end up in Cuba. The pilots managed to talk the gunman out of carrying through with the hijacking. Richard,

who had once been institutionalized at the Columbus, Ohio, State Mental Hospital, gave himself up to the authorities when the plane landed in Miami.

In a different time, the attempted hijacking of a plane carrying a U.S. senator might well have created a groundswell in favor of new laws. Senator Eastland spoke for many in 1968, however, when he suggested there was no need for legislative remedies: “We’ve got all the laws that we need.” Instead, Eastland blamed the Warren Court for the hijacking problem. “It’s all the Supreme Court’s affair—they make it possible for criminals to run wild.” In Eastland’s eyes, laws to improve air security would be an unnecessary restriction on personal liberty. “I don’t think any laws Congress might pass would have anything to do with it. . . . That’s like these gun laws,” he said.⁴

A few days ago I flew without incident from Dulles airport to Fort Lauderdale. Had I made this journey in 1968, I would have seen no metal detectors, no sky marshals, and my carry-on and checked luggage would have passed into the plane unscreened. Instead you all know the kinds of security measures I encountered.

I want to thank Florida Atlantic University for their invitation to pass through those anti-terrorism protections in order to be here to speak to you today. It is a great honor to inaugurate the John O’Sullivan memorial lecture series. I never met John but from his colleagues I understand what a profound influence he had on the History Department, as a teacher, scholar and faculty leader. Those outside a University often associate being a good professor solely with teaching and writing. Yet it also the small tasks of the faculty member -- make the difference between being a good colleague who creates a community and someone who just teaches in the department. By all accounts, Professor O’Sullivan created a community.

I started with the story of Senator Eastland to dramatize how public expectations about security can change. What would be unthinkable now—boarding a plane without screening or witnessing a hijacking without screaming—was not then. In his work on the military draft, John O’Sullivan examined the tension between the principle of personal liberty upon which this country was founded and the occasional need for the United States to require its citizens to give their service

and occasionally their lives.⁵ Many politicians, journalists, ordinary Americans, however patriotic, have never been fully comfortable with conscription. And, so, when the threat passes, the country's procedures for forming a mass army are allowed to decay until the next threat appears.

This cycle of complacency, mobilization and demobilization is also central to the history of American counterterrorism. The fight against international terrorists involves actions and measures that seem in conflict with the basic principles of our country: the planning of assassinations abroad, the recruitment of unsavory characters and the implementation of domestic anti-terrorism measures that limit commerce and civil liberties. For a generation before 9/11, the US government, as much as the average citizen, resisted taking on this fight. As I will explain today, no single President—including the current one—has successfully mediated between the requirements of effective counterterrorism and the requirements of a liberal democracy.

I intend to focus on three distinct periods in the evolution of modern US counterterrorism before 9/11. The first involves the US government's handling of Palestinian terrorism in the 1970s. The second is the era of Ronald Reagan's so-called war on terrorism in the 1980s. The third is the Clinton administration's handling of the threat from jihadists, most notably bin Laden in the 1990s.

Since I started by dividing history into three let me add that each of these moments in time illustrates three basic facts of how we dealt with terrorists for over thirty years. First, the US government assumed that international terrorists did not pose a strategic threat to the country. It reacted to terrorist incidents without ever altering that basic assumption. Second, there were limits on what a President could do about terrorism, whatever his assumptions about the threat. Third, the US could be quite successful at counterterrorism when it put its mind to it; whereas institutionally and philosophically, we have consistently had a hard time establishing effective domestic anti-terrorism.

The story of US efforts against international terrorism begins with the radicalization of Yasir Arafat's Fatah guerrilla movement following the Six Day War of 1967. When Palestinians attempted to hijack four planes simultaneously in

September 1970 – a feat not achieved until al Qaeda did it in September 2001—the US government felt for the first time that it had to manage the hijacking problem. People of a certain age will recall the dramatic photographs of four Western airliners, two of which were American, on a tarmac in the Jordanian desert. Flown there after simultaneous attacks in September 1970, these wide-bodied jets were ultimately blown up by the PLO. None of the passengers was killed but their fate hung in the balance for three tense weeks.

The September 1970 event forced the US government to take the problem of airline security seriously for the first time. Washington's reaction 35 years ago illustrated the difficulties that would confront all administrations before September 11 on this issue. At issue was how seriously to take terrorism. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, and the president's foreign policy team downplayed the threat from terrorism. Seeing the PLO as a regional problem in the volatile Middle East, they preferred to use diplomacy to manage Yasir Arafat. Nixon's foreign policy advisors were not alone in downplaying this problem. The Pentagon, which was then fighting a war in Vietnam and remained concerned about Soviet strategic power, worried that an overreaction to the tiny PLO would create a new mission for them. The airlines and their ally the Federal Aviation Administration feared that an overreaction would lead to costly security measures at airports and would put a damper on business traffic. In those days, the airlines paid for security screeners. The only official in Washington who was seriously concerned about the US government's inability to protect its citizens traveling abroad was the President. Nixon reacted strongly to the September 1970 but his proposed initiatives were softened by his advisors. The federal government did start placing armed air marshals on certain international flights and metal detectors started appearing in pilot programs at US airports.

It took two more years and another very frightening hijacking, this time in the US though not involving the PLO, to force the US government and the airlines to mandate 100% screening of all passengers and carry-on luggage.⁶ Routine screening began at the nation's airports in early 1973.

Meanwhile the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972 did not alter the US government's general view of the PLO. Again Richard Nixon signaled that the administration should act decisively. He wanted the CIA and the FBI to begin working on the problem of international terrorism. In what must be the strangest chapter in the history of US counterterrorism, Nixon's concerns were brought to a high pitch because of a psychic. Nixon liked to consult with Jeane Dixon through his secretary Rose Marie Woods. In the fall of 1972, Dixon predicted the PLO would attempt some highlevel assassinations in the US. Nixon took this seriously and in a lather told Kissinger: "We have got to have a plan. Suppose they kidnap Rabin, Henry, and demand that we release all blacks who are prisoners around the United States, and we didn't and they shoot him? . . . what the Christ, do we do? We are not going to give in to it. . . . we have got to have contingency plans for hijacking, for kidnapping, for all sorts of things that [could] happen around here."⁷

Kissinger disagreed but to satisfy the President he set up a counterterrorism committee and a working group, neither of which he expected much from. Kissinger was much more concerned about the Israelis overreacting to the death of their athletes and hoped that this cosmetic reform would satisfy Golda Meir's government.

Despite Nixon's concerns, the US government's principal policy was to encourage the PLO to choose methods other than terrorism to gain their political aims. In 1973 the CIA and the State Department opened a secret dialogue with Yasir Arafat. This dialogue occurred despite the PLO's responsibility for the Munich massacre and the later killing of two US diplomats in the Sudan. There was no policy of destroyer Arafat or his organization -- no covert schemes.

Why? Because in the 1970s, terrorism was believed to be a small annoyance—a speck in Uncle Sam's eye—not a serious threat. Although the country had some domestic radical organizations that used violence, the Symbionese Liberation Army, for example, serious international terrorism, when it attacked, did so abroad and without any major loss of US lives. It was believed that terrorists chose violence to gain recruits. They therefore did not have an interest in killing too many people.

These ideas about how threatening the PLO was were oddly comforting to administrations of the left and the right in the 1970s. Washington did not want to have to confront the problem of a serious terrorist threat at home. These were the years when the newspapers were full of revelations of past misdeeds by the CIA and the FBI: the CIA's twenty-year illegal program of opening of US mails and the FBI's hounding of civil rights organizations. The public had no stomach for foreign assassination plots or domestic intelligence investigations that verged on harassment. In this climate serious curbs were placed on the FBI and CIA's ability to get tough on terrorist groups.

Some of this would change with Ronald Reagan. As part of his commitment to reassert US power in the 1980s, Reagan intended to go on the offensive against foreign terrorist groups and the states that sponsored them. Curiously, the terrorists Reagan came into office expecting to destroy were not those that would ultimately occupy his administration. Reagan assumed that Moscow was the center of all international terrorism. The evil empire did a lot of nasty things and indeed gave money to foreign terrorist organizations, but Middle Eastern terrorism had indigenous roots.

It was Iranian-sponsored terrorism in Lebanon and not Soviet-sponsored mischief that would force the Reagan administration to be the first US administration to launch a war on terrorism. Between 1983 and 1988, the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah bombed US installations three times, killing over three hundred people, and kidnapped nine Americans, three of whom would be killed. Despite these outrages, the Reagan administration tied itself in knots over what to do about Hezbollah. It tried sanctions against Teheran that didn't work. It debated but never went ahead with a bombing campaign against Hezbollah's training camps. As in the 1970s, the Pentagon resisted counterterrorist missions. Ultimately, Washington chose a secret and ultimately very controversial policy of using US arms sales to seduce the Iranians into putting curbs on their terrorist allies. This would create the Iran side of the Iran-Contra scandal that nearly brought down the Reagan presidency.

The more successful effort in counterterrorism in the Reagan era was not against Iran at all. It involved the formation of a nimble group of CIA officers to

combat all terrorist organizations but in particular the splinter groups of the PLO. Once Arafat began to participate in the peace process, his more violent allies considered him a traitor to the cause. The most violent was Abu Nidal whose 500-person ANO became the most violent international terrorist organization. At Christmas-time 1985, the ANO killed 16 people in a horrific attack on the Vienna and Rome airports. Let us spend some time on this campaign because it would serve as a model for future US efforts against terrorists.

The CIA worked closely with the Israelis, the Jordanians and the regular PLO's intelligence service to destroy the ANO and Abu Nidal. It is the first and thus far greatest US counterterrorism success story. Since the mid-1970s, the ANO had been considered by the United States to be the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world. The ANO had offices in Libya and Syria, and Abu Nidal himself was thought to be living in Syria.

Unlike Hezbollah, the ANO was not beholden to a main state sponsor. Instead ANO had established a series of symbiotic relationships in the Middle East and among Soviet satellites. In 1979, the ANO had signed an agreement with the Poles: in return for promising not to sponsor any terrorism in Poland or against Polish interests, the ANO received safe haven in Warsaw and training for its cadres. The ANO reached a similar arrangement with the East Germans in 1983.⁸ The ANO raised money as an intermediary for transactions involving Eastern European weapons. For example, it made money arranging the sale of embargoed Polish weapons to Iran, Iraq, and Zimbabwe.⁹

Shifts in Cold War provided openings to the CIA to weaken the support structure for Abu Nidal. Soviet economic weaknesses and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's desire to achieve a détente with the West put pressure on the Syrians to improve relations with the United States. Among the Eastern bloc countries, there was also increasing interest in better relations, even with the CIA.

The CIA recognized that the ANO's commercial dealings represented a useful back door into the organization. Unlike Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah, which was clannish and highly secretive, the ANO was an easier target. The commercial

needs of ANO affiliates provided good opportunities for penetration and countermeasures.¹⁰

The CIA followed one of these businessmen, Mufid Tawfiq Musa Hamadeh, into the United States. Musa, who joined the ANO in the 1970s, had been sent to Europe in 1984 to do clandestine work.¹¹ By 1987, he was working in the United States.¹² Musa, who would at some point start cooperating with the United States, was a fund-raiser for the ANO.¹³ The CIA cooperated with the FBI on the ANO case, and besides Musa, the bureau would develop information on a group of “sleeper agents” working for Abu Nidal in Missouri and Wisconsin. These cells were not planning terrorist attacks against U.S. targets. Like the Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army, the ANO came to the United States to build bank accounts—to raise money from sympathizers—not to destroy bank buildings.

As the CIA developed information on the ANO’s international connections, the NSC and a former U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, worked to convince Syria that it should be more helpful in dealing with the ANO. In early 1987, the Pakistani government informed the United States that it had “irrefutable” evidence that Syria was behind the Abu Nidal team that had attacked the Pan Am plane in Karachi in September. The Pakistanis had sent a formal protest to the Syrian prime minister, who had denied the accusation. Former president Carter was slated to go to Syria in March 1987 to talk to Hafiz al-Assad on behalf of the Reagan administration. The Pakistani story included among Carter’s briefing matters.¹⁴

After initially denying what he knew about the Syrian role, Assad made a surprising admission to Carter. “They kept it from me,” he explained. The Reagan administration subsequently concluded that Assad was telling the truth about being out of the loop on the Karachi terrorist attack. He subsequently purged several high-ranking members of his intelligence community, including the chief of air force intelligence. More important for the United States, shortly after Carter’s visit, the Syrian government told Abu Nidal to leave.

It was an important achievement for U.S. counterterrorism experts. The expulsion disoriented the ANO, which had to relocate its personnel to Libya and Lebanon. But the more important accomplishments would come later in 1987. The

PLO had an interest in undermining Abu Nidal and helped the CIA. So, too, did the Jordanians and the Israelis.¹⁵ Working with allies, the CTC developed a strategy for undermining the ANO from within. Having discovered that the ANO was a deeply paranoid organization, the CTC decided to work with its allies to magnify that paranoia. In the 1930s, Joseph Stalin had killed or sidelined his most talented lieutenants out of fear; perhaps Abu Nidal could be made to do the same thing. Salah Kahlaf, alias Abu Iyad, who was Arafat's chief of intelligence, provided information to the CIA on the progress of these efforts, as the PLO collected defectors from the ANO.¹⁶

More dramatic than the defections were the assassinations of Abu Nidal lieutenants by Abu Nidal himself or his henchmen provoked by US or allied disinformation. In November 1987, Jasir al-Disi (Abu Ma'mun) and Ayish Badran (Abu Umar), reputedly the best officers in the ANO's "People's Army," were killed in Lebanon on Abu Nidal's orders. The two men were accused of being Jordanian spies, and once they were arrested, tortured, and killed, Abu Nidal then purged their supposed allies in the army. Dozens of other officers were subsequently shot and buried in a mass grave in Bqasta Faouqa, Lebanon.¹⁷ Also murdered in 1987 were Ibrahim al-Abd, from the Finance Directorate; Mujahid al-Bayyari, from the Intelligence Directorate; and Muhammed Khair (Nur Muharib) and Mustafa Umran, from the ANO's Political Directorate.¹⁸ In October 1988, Abu Nidal killed his former deputy, Abu Nizar.¹⁹

The work against the ANO continued into the George H. W. Bush administration. In May 1989, the CIA and the PLO achieved a major victory with the defection of Atif Abu Bakr, one of Abu Nidal's closest associates. In June 1990, forces loyal to Abu Bakr attacked and overran Abu Nidal's headquarters in Lebanon, killing eighty of the ANO in the process.²⁰

These detections, defections, and deaths did not destroy the ANO, but from 1990–91, it would never again pose a significant threat to U.S. interests. Abu Nidal would not die for another decade but he was effectively neutralized.

Although it ultimately tried to buy Iranian support in the struggle against terrorism, the Reagan administration chose to use force against another terrorist state

sponsor. In the spring of 1986, the Administration launched a military strike against the home and headquarters of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, who supported among other organizations the ANO and the Irish Republican Army. The military strike failed to achieve its objective. Gadhafi survived the attack and like a bee that came close to being swatted became even more determined to sting. In 1988, Libyan agents would arrange the destruction of Pan Am 103, which crashed in Lockerbie, Scotland, claiming 270 people.

The administration's efforts to improve domestic security were equally unsuccessful. No changes were made to the restrictions on the FBI's ability to do terrorist intelligence investigations and despite holes in port and border security found by a task force chaired by Vice President George H. W. Bush, the Reagan administration did not attempt to remedy these problems. They were too hard politically, especially in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal.

At the end of the George H. W. Bush administration there was a sense that the terrorism problem was a thing of the past. The CIA had finished off the Abu Nidal organization and fingered Abimael Guzman of the Peruvian Shining Path. Meanwhile, Carlos the Jackal was on the run, the PLO was engaged in the Middle East peace process, and Western European extremists were either dead or had lost their ideological focus with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Terrorism did not figure at all as an issue in the presidential campaign of 1992 and the foreign policy experts of the victorious Clinton team did not list terrorism as a priority for the incoming administration.

Over the next three years, however, the Clinton administration would show itself to be a quick study on terrorism. Five events that occurred between 1993 and 1995 alerted the administration that far from being a dead issue, terrorism would require a serious response:

- a) Mir Kansi attack on the CIA:
- b) The first World Trade Center Bombing
- c) Day of Terror Plot against the George Washington Bridge, the UN building, the Holland and Midtown tunnels

d) Aum Shinrikyo cult's attack on Tokyo subway using Sarin gas, killing twelve and injuring 3,769.

e) Discovery of Bojinka plot.

In 1995, the CIA established a special unit to investigate the shadowy Islamic networks and the so-called charity organizations that financed Sunni extremists. At the time it was assumed that the most dangerous terrorists were freelancers. The model was Ramzi Yousef, the man who made the bomb that blew up in the parking garage under the World Trade Center in February 1993. Yousef was nabbed in a joint US-Pakistani operation in the spring of 1995.

By 1996, the CIA had renamed its special Sunni extremist unit. It was now the Osama bin Laden station. For months US intelligence discovered that bin Laden was the most active of the financiers of Islamic terror. Knowledge of his activities was limited however. He was believed to be a banker and not an organizer himself. At the time he lived in Sudan.

The Clinton administration successfully put pressure on the Sudanese to expel bin Laden. He and his headquarters were forced to go to Afghanistan. Another initiative of the Clinton administration was less successful. That year 1995, Clinton introduced an anti-terrorism package to Congress. It was an attempt to remove some of the restrictions established in the 1970s to complicate political intelligence gathering by the FBI. The FBI found itself a step behind terrorists. A coalition of rightwingers and some from the left in the House joined to kill this bill. In 1996, the administration resubmitted the bill and Congress passed a much watered down version a few months later.

The Clinton administration began taking bin Laden seriously as a terrorist operative in 1998. In August, al Qaeda executed a complicated simultaneous attack on two US embassies. From that day until the end of Clinton's term, the US government looked for ways to kill or neutralize bin Laden. Operation Infinite Reach in August 1998 -- 79 cruise missiles launched at bin Laden's headquarters in Afghanistan and a suspected chemical weapons plant in Sudan.

From 1998 - 2001, the Clinton administration had identified bin Laden as a significant threat, mobilized covert resources to find him and kill him; yet he escaped

and his organization, al Qaeda was able to plan and execute what they called “the Planes Operation” against targets in New York City and Washington, D.C.

What happened?

There were limits as to what Counterterrorism could achieve. To kill bin Laden the US needed sources close to him. This is very difficult to do. If one looks at US efforts to kill Fidel Castro or even the German resistance’s efforts to kill Adolf Hitler one sees the difficulties involved in trying to arrange foreign assassinations. Secondly, to foil the 9/11 plot one thing the US needed was a source close to the conspiracy itself. Throughout the Cold War the US had few high-level sources in the Kremlin and this involved a target that the US had studied and worked against for a generation. Between 1996 and 2001, the CIA had five years to penetrate al Qaeda, that is not a long time when the target is clannish, secretive and thousands of miles away.

Where the US fell down was in its lack of defensive security measures. There was no safety net to detect the low-level types involved in a conspiracy against US territory. Watchlists were not organized across agencies. Suspects who could not get a visa from the State Department if they somehow managed to get inside the US were allowed by the FAA to fly. One agency’s files on bad people were unavailable to another agency. Airport screeners were poorly paid and poorly motivated. They had little training in how to spot suspicious individuals.

Clinton had tried to improve US domestic security—indeed implementing some what VP Bush’s task force had recommended in 1996—but he ran into determined opposition from Congressional republicans. Even so Clinton did not use the Presidency to create public support for these measures.

It was a curious misstep by Clinton who was otherwise so sensitive to the need to enlist the public in a national initiative. Was it the country’s almost sarcastic reaction to the retaliatory strikes against bin Laden in the summer of 1998 that caused his reluctance in this instance? Clinton did refer to terrorism in later speeches but his administration did not attempt any sustained public education on the issue. Whatever the reason, as Clinton left office, the public had little understanding of the stakes in fighting this new terrorist phenomenon. When in the hard-fought

presidential campaign of 2000 neither George W. Bush nor Clinton's Vice President Al Gore cited counterterrorism as a priority of the next administration, the public accepted this omission. Too ill-prepared by their leaders, the American people did not ask, 'what about bin Laden?'

There was less reason for the air of complacency that had settled over the US Congress in 2000. The House and Senate leadership were kept informed of the hunt for bin Laden and the administration's concerns about al Qaeda. Yet they, too, seemed to view bin Laden as a faraway threat.

As a result, George W. Bush would come to power without any public or congressional pressure to do something about Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. The incoming administration could, if it wished, turn its gaze.

To be fair to Clinton and Bush, none of their counterterrorism experts, even the resolute and resourceful Richard Clarke had predicted the use of airplanes as weapons. They viewed the greatest threat to US security as the use of weapons of mass destruction by al Qaeda. Intelligence estimates put that problem as quite a few years away. In the meantime, it was assumed that al Qaeda could do not greater damage than what Abu Nidal had done—a few hundred dead Americans. Sad, but not catastrophic. Clarke advised both presidents that there was time to mount a 3-5 year campaign against al Qaeda. His goal was to replicate the CIA's Reagan-era success against Abu Nidal. Even after sensing that a new virulent strain of terrorist had evolved; the best counterterrorist officers were still trapped in the world of the 1980s.

Thus it was that a country that had faced various forms of terrorism since the late 1960s and had recognized the evolution of a more virulent form in the 1990s was caught by surprise on September 11, 2001. The road taken by the country over thirty years illustrated the pressures that prevented a more effective approach to terrorism. The costs of overreaction seemed high to politicians, who worried about the consequences of greater domestic intelligence gathering and security measures; whereas the risks of a serious terrorist attack in the United States seemed acceptable. For all its successes against Abu Nidal and a few other terrorists, the US government

was not flexible enough to change these basic assumptions absent an external shock. Unfortunately, bin Laden would deliver that blow.

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5. John O'Sullivan, *From Voluntarism to Conscription: Congress and Selective Service, 1940-1945*, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982).
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7. *Nixon Tapes*, Tape 784-7, Sept. 21, 1972.
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15. Mark Perry, *Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA* (New York: Morrow, 1992), pp. 191–194; telcon with Fred Turco, Feb. 24, 2004.
16. Perry, *Eclipse*, pp. 192–193.
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ABOUT JOHN O'SULLIVAN

John O'Sullivan was a gifted teacher and scholar who devoted his entire academic career to Florida Atlantic University. He came to FAU in 1971 after receiving his Ph.D. from Columbia University. Since then he touched the lives of hundreds of FAU students with his brilliant and inspired teaching. An accomplished scholar, his publications included *The Draft and Its Enemies* (1974), *From Volunteerism to Conscription: Congress and the Selective Service, 1940-1945* (1982), *American Economic History* (1989), and *We Have Just Begun Not to Fight: An Oral History of Conscientious Objectors in Civilian Public Service during World War II* (co-authored with Heather Frazer, 1996). Before his death in 2000, John was working on a book project related to Medal of Honor recipients and another book project with Patricia Kollander, also an FAU faculty member, on a World War II veteran. That book was published in 2005: *I Must Be a Part of This War: One Man's Fight against Hitler and Nazism*.

JOHN O'SULLIVAN MEMORIAL LECTURES

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