us to project additional representations of the same, correcting or completing the first, and, hence, to make a distinction between truth and justified representation. The experience of continuity accounts for our ability to conceive of what would be under counterfactual conditions, e.g., an ideal end of inquiry. Modern dogma having been rejected, it becomes possible to consider that what we have come to feel is a better way of understanding the world actually is a better way of understanding it. If it does not lead to such conclusions, then what is the import of what Peirce, James, and Dewey said about experience?

In Chapter 7, on Putnam’s view that fact and value are ‘entangled’, Bernstein approves Putnam’s rejection of metaphysical realism but is not persuaded that he has evaded relativism. Might the problem be that without realism there can only be relativism? Bernstein, as noted, traces the pragmatic turn to Peirce’s attack on Cartesianism; but that attack entails realism re universals. Peirce always held nominalism to be the fundamental error of modern thought, and in later years he insisted that pragmatism entails modal realism. Has contemporary philosophy further to turn, pragmatically?

Chapter 8 is the longest of the book; its exposition of Jürgen Habermas’ recent thought is helpful and I found its criticism of the same persuasive. The book appropriately ends with a chapter on the late Richard Rorty, for it has been from the beginning an extended debate with Rorty. Bernstein agrees in general with Rorty’s view that the three philosophic traditions are interrelated, and he disputes that same view in many particulars.

T.L. Short
tlshort@earthlink.net

DOROTA KOCZANOWICZ AND WOJCIHE MALECKI, EDITORS
Shusterman’s Pragmatism. Between Literature and Somaesthetics
Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi, 2012, 236 pp with index

In the past few years, commentary literature on the work of Richard Shusterman, the foremost contemporary representative of pragmatist aesthetics, has steadily grown. Symposia on Shusterman’s theory have been published in various journals, and about three years ago the first monograph-length study examining Shusterman’s views on aesthetics was released. Now alongside these pieces a collection of articles edited by Dorota Koczanowicz and the author of the book on Shusterman’s pragmatist aesthetics Wojcieh Malecki has appeared. The anthology consists of twelve essays devoted to different parts of Shusterman’s pragmatism, as well as two articles by Shusterman himself, an intellectual
biography that begins the article section of the anthology and a commentary piece on the articles of the collection.

In the first essay, Shusterman traces the path of his philosophical development from his early work on analytic philosophy of literature to the multidisciplinary field of somaesthetics that Shusterman has lately devoted most of his intellectual efforts on developing. As disconnected as these two parts of Shusterman's philosophical output may seem, he nevertheless argues that they are connected by an attempt to test and transcend established intellectual boundaries. Otherwise, the essay does not provide much new information, particularly to those readers already familiar with Shusterman’s critique of analytic aesthetics.

Even though the articles of the collection approach Shusterman’s pragmatism from a broad range of questions and perspectives, somaesthetics emerges as the book’s most important theme, for issues relevant to this discipline are considered in many articles besides those included in the section of the book explicitly devoted to somaesthetics. This choice of emphasis could perhaps have deserved some more thought, for as Shusterman notes in his response to the articles, because of the background of the collection—most of the book’s essays originate from a conference held in Poland in 2008—it was not possible for the authors to take more substantially into account his most systematic work on somaesthetics, namely the book *Body Consciousness* (2008). Nevertheless, as Shusterman also observes, some of the articles manage to raise good points regarding somaesthetics that he needs to think about in the future in more depth.

The first section of the book dealing with Shusterman’s aesthetics and philosophy of literature is somewhat of a disappointment. This is mainly because only in one of the four articles this part consists of—in that by Wojcieh Malecki on the question of whether autobiographical facts can be legitimately relied on in arguing for a particular philosophical position—Shusterman is clearly the main figure, while in the remaining three the views of other philosophers and intellectuals like T.S. Eliot, Richard Rorty, and John Ashbery are given more space than Shusterman’s ideas. This is not to say that the articles of the first part would not be worth reading on their own right. On the contrary, they are all rather engaging. The articles would, however, have deepened the picture the book presents of Shusterman’s pragmatism, had the authors integrated Shusterman’s views more firmly into them. For example, in Dorota Koczanowicz’s article, where she compares conceptions presented in pragmatist aesthetics on the power of art to fuel meaning into our lives with Iris Murdoch’s well-known account of art’s capacity to enhance a phenomenon Murdoch calls “unselfing” that is the core concept of her ethics, Shusterman’s role seems to be limited to a mere commentator on Dewey’s aesthetics. It is also unfortunate that some
parts of Shusterman's aesthetics, like the great work he did on philosophy of interpretation some twenty years back, are not touched at all.

The articles of the two preceding parts are more focused on Shusterman's work. The first of these concern issues in metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, while the latter focuses on somaesthetics. In the beginning essay of the second part, Sami Pihlström critically engages with the view of a philosophical life Shusterman formulates and points out some unfounded assumptions he sees in this attempt, mainly having to do with its implications for the position of metaphysics in philosophical inquiry. Pihlström also argues that any comprehensive view of a philosophical life has to account for the question of death and the limited nature of human existence. Don Morse examines Shusterman's criticism of Dewey that tries to demonstrate the hasty downplay of the erotic in Dewey's understanding of embodied experience. Morse also indicates some threats he believes accommodating the erotic in Shusterman's sense within pragmatism may have. In the concluding essay of this part, Jerold J. Abrams re-examines Shusterman's account of self-styling in light of recent scientific and technological developments.

The last part of the collection consists of four articles on somaesthetics. Monika Bokiniec presents an interesting evaluation of Shusterman's reading of de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex*. In his article, Robert Dobrowolski connects somaesthetics with Shusterman's earlier work on hip-hop culture, while Martin Jay's essay—the only previously published article of the collection—investigates the relevance of the developments body art went through in the latter parts of the last century for somaesthetics.

All in all, the articles of the collection make up a nice read. However, they do let off Shusterman rather easily, which is reflected in Shusterman's commentary ending the book. There Shusterman states that he will not try to invent systematic knockdown counterarguments to the criticisms of his views presented in the articles of the collection, but will instead focus on elaborating on some points and presenting new lines of inquiry they have inspired in him. Shusterman finds this sort of response a more fruitful way of continuing the discussion than the former line of response. However, the mildness of Shusterman's response to the essays is also explained by the fact that the challenge they pose for his views is not so thoroughgoing to require that systematic defense from Shusterman's part. A truly critical study of the work of the main figure of current pragmatist aesthetics still awaits itself.

Kalle Puolakka
University of Helsinki
kalle.puolakka@helsinki.fi