Prof. Mark Tunick
Tutorial: Promises and Moral Obligation

Description:
William Godwin writes, "I have promised to bestow a sum of money upon some good and respectable purpose. In the interval between the promise and my fulfilling it, a greater and nobler purpose offers itself, and calls with an imperious voice for my cooperation. Which ought I to prefer? That which best deserves my preference. A promise can make no alteration in the case."
Many philosophers disagree--to have promised is to have undertaken a prima facie obligation that must at least be duly weighed against our preferences. We take up this debate, and the question of how uttering certain words might create an obligation. Focusing on promising will let us explore the general topic of moral obligation. One general moral controversy we shall consider in our readings is a debate between adherents of a 'practice conception' and adherents of a 'principle conception'. The former believe that we can resolve our questions about promissory obligations by appealing simply to the rules of the practice of promising. The latter, failing to see how we could, or why we should, appeal to existing rules and practices to determine what we ought to do, or to explain how obligations arise, determine what we should do in particular cases by turning instead to principles of right or rational conduct, principles that may or may not conform with existing practice.

Requirements:
Each week we will discuss one short work by a moral philosopher. Students will be asked to write one 5 page paper, a critical response to one article. A draft will be due on the day we discuss the article--the student will lead discussion on that day. A final version of the paper is due ... 

Schedule:
I. Introduction. William Godwin, 'Of Promises' 
II. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, excerpts
III. John Rawls, 'Two concepts of rules' (1955)
IV. John Searle, 'How to derive ought from is' (1964, 1969)
V. Neil MacCormack, 'Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers I' (1972)
VI. Korn and Korn, 'Where People Don't Promise'(1983)
VII. Thomas Scanlon, 'Promises and Practices'(1990)
VIII. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, excerpts
IX. Mark Tunick, "Promises," chapter 3 of Practices and Principles (1997)






Further Reading on promises
Anscombe, G.E.M., Ethics, Religion and Politics (1981), pp. 10-21, 97-103
Ardal, Pall, Philosophical Quarterly 18:72 (July 1968)
Brandt, Richard, Mind 73:374-393 (1964)
Downie, R.S., Philosophical Quarterly 35:140 (July 1985)
Durrant, R.G., Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.41 (1963), 44-56
Grant, C.K., Mind 58:231 (July 1949)
Hamlyn, D.W., Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 1961-62
Hare, R.M., in W.D. Hudson, The Is-Ought Question (1969), 144-156
Melden, A.I., Mind 65:257 (June 1956)
Narveson, Jan, Journal of Philosophy 1:2 (December 1971)
Peetz, Vera, Mind vol. 86 (1977), 578-581.
Robins, Michael H., Mind, vol. 85 (1976), 321-340.

Mark Tunick
Honors College, FAU